Probabilistic safety assessment for secondary standard dosimetry laboratory

Authors

  • Juan Guillermo Ramírez Servicio Geológico Colombiano
  • Andrea Sánchez Galindo Servicio Geológico Colombiano
  • José Esaú Garavito Servicio Geológico Colombiano
  • María Esperanza Castellanos Pontificia Universidad Javeriana

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.32685/2590-7468/invapnuclear.4.2020.549

Keywords:

Safety assessment, Radiation Risk, Secondary Standards Dosimetry Laboratory, Fault tree, Master Logic Diagram

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How to Cite

[1]
J. G. Ramírez, A. Sánchez Galindo, J. E. Garavito, and M. E. Castellanos, “Probabilistic safety assessment for secondary standard dosimetry laboratory”, rev. investig. apl. nucl., no. 4, pp. 55–64, Sep. 2020.

Issue

No. 4 (2020)

Section

Articles

Published

2020-09-01
Abstract Downloads References

Abstract

A probabilistic safety analysis methodology was applied for the quantification of the radiological risk associated with the operation of the HopeWell model G-100 irradiator in the Secondary Standard Dosimetry Laboratory of the Servicio Geológico Colombiano. The irradiator had a 60Co radioactive source with nominal activity of 185 TBq considered as an extremely dangerous source for people according to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The analysis contemplated the initiating events identification by means of the methodology of master logical diagrams, the determination of the accidental sequences and their frequency by means of fault trees and the estimation of the magnitude of the consequence of each accidental sequence based on the probability causing death of an individual associated with the exposure scenario proposed. The quantified risk was 1, 6 x 10–5 per year for mortal exposition, which is below than the established restriction of 1,44 x 10–4 per year for mortal exposition. Finally, it was found that the most critical security and safety dispositions are those related to training about the meaning of the warning signals at the beginning of the last man outside (LMO) sequences and the beginning of the irradiation, followed by the warning signs.

References

[1] Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica, Clasificación de las fuentes radiactivas: Guía de seguridad RSG-1.9, Viena: OIEA, 2009.

[2] J. Purba, “Master Logic Diagram: An approach to identify initiating events of HTGRs”, Journal of Physics, vol. 962, conference series n.° 012036, pp. 1-7, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/962/1/012036

[3] Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica, Aplicación del método de la matriz de riesgo a la radioterapia IAEA-TECDOC-1685/S, Viena: OIEA, 2012.

[4] Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica, Practical radiation technical manual, health effects and medical surveillance, Viena: OIEA, 2004.

[5] Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica, Analisis probabilisistico de seguridad de tratamientos de radioterapia con acelerador lineal, IAEA-TECDOC-1670/S, Viena: OIEA, 2012.

[6] Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica, Development and application of level 1 probabilistic safety assessment for nuclear power plants - Specific safety guide SSG-3, Viena: OIEA, 2010.

[7] Comisión Internacional de Protección Radiológica, ICRP publicación 103L: Las recomendaciones 2007 de la Comisión Internacional de Protección Radiológica, Madrid: Senda Editorial, 2007.

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